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THE STATE OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN
THE STATES OF THE UNITED STATES:
ARE THERE ANY LESSONS FOR
AUSTRALIA?
JOHN D LESHY*

I. A COMPARATWE OVERVIEW OF
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND STRUCTURE IN
AUSTRALIAAND THE UNITED SflTES
A brief sketch of the constitutional frameworks in our two countries
is a logical beginning point.’ First, there are the decided similarities.
Our nations share a strong tradition of federalism. Each national gov
ernment overlays states that are themselves sovereign, with their own
constitutions. In each country, in fact, self-governing states preceded
the establishment of the central government. In each, moreover, the
powers of the national government are formally enumerated, and the
powers of the state governments are generally considered residual and

inherent

*

1.

Professor of Law, Arizona State University College of Law.
See generally, J A Thomson “State Constitutional Law: American Lessons for
Australian Adventures” (1985) 63 Tex L Rev 1225; A Rapaczynski “Biblio
graphical Essay: The Influence of U.S. Constitutionalism Abroad” in L Henkin
and A J Rosenthal (eds) Constitutionalism and Rights: The influence of the
United States Constitution Abroad (New Yorlc Columbia University Press, 1989)
405, 442-447; C Saunders 9’he Constitutional Framework: Hybrid, Derivative
but Australian” Paper no 13 on Federalism (Centre for Comparative Constitutionai
Studies, Law School, University of Melbourne, March 1989); P H Lane An
introduction To The Australian Constitution 5th edn (Sydney: Law Book Go,
1990); RD Lumb The Constitutions of the Australian States 4th edn (St Lucia:
University of Queensland Press, 1977).
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The constitutional arrangements likewise have broad similarities.
The federal and state constitutions in both countries create democratic
governments with legislative, executive and judicial branches. The
legislative branches are bicameral (the states of Queensland and Ne
braska excepted) and possessing of relatively sweeping powers. The
judicial branches of state and federal governments in both countries are
largely independent of the other branches. In both, judicial review of
the acts of the other branches for conformity to constitutional com
mands is a long-accepted fact of constitutional life.
There are, to be sure, some important differences. Both the federal
and state governments in Australia operate under a parliamentary sys
tem of responsible government that substantially unifies control of the
legislative and executive branches. In the United States, by contrast,
these branches remain separate and distinct in both the federal and all
state governments. In fact, the trend in the US toward divided govern
ment where one political party controls the executive and the other
party controls one or both houses of the legislature is accelerating in
both federal and state governments. There are echoes of this experience
in Australia; that is, upper houses can be controlled by parties out of
power and have sometimes acted to check executive power.2
Constitutions in the US tend to be more formally self-contained
charters, more sharply distinct from ordinary legislation, than in Aus
tralia. Here a state constitution is not located in one place; rather it is,
in the words of Professor Lumb, “fissiparous both in content and form
an elusive beast, hard to pin down.”~
While there are substantial variations in procedures for amending
state constitutions in the US, in every state but Delaware proposed
amendments, no matter how arrived at, must be submitted directly to
the voters for ratification. In Australia, on the other hand, amending
procedures have been described as “basically flexible to which
have been added some rigid ‘manner and form’ requirements.tm
These differences might be more exaggerated in form than they are
in practice. Many states in both countries share the common require-

-

...

...

...

2.
3.
4.

See Thomson supra n 1, 1233 text accompanying n 44.
RD Lumb “Methods of Alteration of State Constitutions in the United States and
Australia” (1982) 13 FL Rev 1,4.
Ibid, 2.
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ment that legislative proposals for constitutional amendments must
gain a special majority.5 While US state constitutions may have more
of a veneer of permanence, many are in fact readily amendable by pro
cedures that do not differ all that much from ordinary legislation. And
they are quite frequently amended.
Another often-noted distinction is that the Australian constitutions,
unlike those in the US, have no formal, separate bills of rights suc
cinctly protecting a range of individual freedoms such as speech,
religion, and privacy. Here too, however, it is easy to make too much
of this difference. Some provisions in Australian constitutions strongly
echo parts of US bills of rights, and other protections for individual
rights can readily be implied, just as some important rights have been
found implicit in US constitutions.6
Another difference is the fact that, in the US, decisions of state
courts of last resort construing state constitutions are not reviewable by
the US Supreme Court. In Australia the High Court is the final arbiter
of state as well as federal constitutional law. In other words, there is no
“adequate and independent state ground” doctrine like the one that
prevents the US Supreme Court from reviewing state court decisions
resting only on the state constitution.7 This suggests a greater potential
for uniformity in Australian constitutional law than is possible in
United States constitutional law. Whether this feature ofjudicial re
view is as significant in practice as it is in theory is not certain, but it
might be a significant obstacle to a full flowering of state constitutional
law in Australia.
A final difference is less formally structural than it is rooted in
historical tradition. The US has long made what one scholar has aptly

5.
6.
7.

Ibid, 3.
See, for example, Street u Queensland Bar Association (1989) 63 ALJR 715
Deane J, 737-738; N K F O’Neill ‘Constitutional Human Rights in Australia”
(1987) 17 FL Rev 85. Compare Griswold u Connecticut 381 US 479(1965).
It is not entirely clear whether the US could, without constitutional amendment,
adopt the Australian model, allowing the US Supreme Court to become the
ultimate arbiter of state as well as federal constitutional law. The Supreme Court
has hinted that serious constitutional questions would be raised if Congress acted
to vest the Court with the power of review over questions of state law. See
Murdock u Mayor and Aldermen of Memphis 87 US (20 Wall) 590 (1874). A
leading constitutional scholar in the US goes further, believing such legislation
would probably be unconstitutional. See L H Tribe American Constitutional Law
2nd edn (Mineola, New York: Foundation Press, 1988) 163.
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cplled a “cultural commitment to judicial oversight.’5 Americans are
accustomed to the idea ofajudiciary that engages in a relatively farranging search for perceived injustices to correct, often (though hardly
exclusively) through interpreting and enforcing constitutional provi
sions.
Even though the idea of judicial review is well entrenched in
Australia, this tradition does not seem as strong. One commentator
recently concluded that Australia’s “generally less activist”judiciary,
together with Australian constitutions’ more obscure protections for
individual rights, make Australian courts “more a guardian of the
structure of government established by the Constitution than a defender
of the rights of the individual or of a minority against the state.’5
Without minimizing these differences, it nevertheless seems that
the commonalities are, broadly considered, more notable. This sug
gests, in turn, that genuine opportunities for constitutional crossfertilization exist.

II. THE RESURGENCE OF STATE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN THE UNITED
SPATES
Truly the most exciting development in constitutional law in the US
in the past couple of decades has been the pronounced revival of
interest and activity in state constitutional law. Like many US trends,
this one might fairly be said to have begun in California in the early
1970s. It has spread with remarkable speed.
One illustration captures the point. The US Supreme Court squarely
settled, in the mid-1970s, that a person has no right, under the free
speech clause of the US Constitution, to engage in political speech or
activity (such as gathering signatures on a political petition) in pri
vately owned shopping malls)° The Federal Constitution was held to
prohibit governmental, and not private, restraints on speech. Put an
other way, the federal constitutional protection for free speech yields to
private property rights.

8.
9.

10.

A Chayes “The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation” (1976)89 l-Iarv L Rev
1281, 1307.
Rapacz~mski supra n 1,446-447.
Lloyd Corporation v Tanner 407 US 551 (1972); Hudgens u National Labour
Relations Board 424 US 507(1976).
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In the last ten years, appellate courts of a dozen different states,
including some of the most populous in the country (California, Con
necticut, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, Pennsylvania and
Washington) have considered the same issue under their own state
constitutions.’ For almost all of them, the matter was one of first
impression, even though the state constitutional provisions in question
had existed for decades or even centuries.
The results of these cases were mixed. Some of the state courts held
that their constitutions did not protect such a right.’2 Others held
otherwise.’3 All the state courts agreed, however, that what the US
Supreme Court had said was not controlling. This is the hallmark of
this revival: a state court willingness to examine its own state consti
tution independently, and not to be suffocated by the US Supreme
Court’s constitutional analysis. No state high court not even those in
“outback” bastions of conservatism like Idaho, Utah, or Arizona has
proved immune from the lure of taking a fresh, independent look at its
ftindamental charter of state government.
Of course, judicial application of state constitutions existed prior to
the 1970s. Inmost states, on some subjects, there has always been an
active state constitutional law. Generally, though, these were areas
where the US Constitution offered or implied no federal constitutional
norm. As the US Supreme Court expanded the reach of the Federal
Constitution (something it has rather consistently done over the last
century), the gaps customarily filled by the state constitutions corre
-

-

11.

12.
13.

Fiesta Mall Venture v Mecham Recall Committee 159 Ariz 371, 767 P 2d 719
(App 1988) (Arizona); Robins v Pruneyard Shopping Center 23 Cal 3d 1989; 592
P 2d 341 (1979) affirmed 447 US 74(1980) (California); Cologne v Westfarms
Associates 192 Conn 48, 469 A 2d 1201 (1984) (Connecticut); Batchelder v
Allied Stares International Inc 388 Mass 83, 455 NE Ed 2d 590 (1983)
(Massachusets); Woodland v Michigan Citizens Lobby 423 Mich 188,378 NW 2d
337 (1985) (Michigan); State u Schmid 84 NJ 535, 423 A 2d 615 (1980) (New
Jersey); Western Pennsylvania Socialist Workers 1982 Campaign u Connecticut
General Life Insurance Co 512 Pa 23,515 A 2d 1331(1986) (Pennsylvania); and
Alderwood Associates u Washington Environmental Council 96 Wash 2d 230,635
P 2d 108(1981) (Washington).
Arizona, Connecticut, Michigan, Pennsylvania.
California, New Jersey, Washington. The Massachussets decision allowing politi
cal activity in a shopping centre was not based on the free speech prevision but
on a ainstitutional provision which establishes free elections and the right olstate
inhabitants to elect offices and be elected to public office. Batchelder supra n 11.
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spondingly shrank. As a result, state constitutional law steadily with
ered into obscurity, especially from the 1930s through the 1960s.
While not wholly new, state constitutional law is undergoing
enormous expansion. State courts are not just applying state
constitutional law by default, to fill those narrowing interstices left by
the sprawling Federal Constitution. They are also, as the free speech in
shopping mall example shows, applying state constitutions independ
ently on issues addressed in nearly identical terms by both state and
federal constitutions. They are, in short, manifesting a new attitude a
willingness to think for themse1ves with a confident spirit of independ
ence that approaches hubris as they exercise their power to interpret
state constitutions.
This trend, once begun, becomes substantially self-reinforcing.
Each time a state court renders a decision uncoupling its state consti
tution from the federal, or breathing life into a long-ignored or mori
bund constitutional provision, litigants are in effect invited to explore
similar possibilities elsewhere. Because state constitutions often textu
ally depart from the Federal Constitution, and cover many areas the
Federal Constitution does not, they frequently contain fertile ground
for law reform litigators across the political spectrum.
State courts also borrow emerging constitutional interpretations and
ideas from each other. Such borrowing follows well-worn paths of
communication. State high courts have long shared ideas in the many
areas (such as the common law of torts, contracts, and the like, as well
as constitutional law) where they share a common tradition.
Today, state constitutional law is booming, with an ever-widening
supporting cast and satellite industries. Newsletters, regular columns in
legal newspapers, greater coverage by the general media, and a monthly
state constitutional law bulletin’4 keep practitioners and scholars amund
the country in constant touch with emerging developments. State
constitutional law is also finding its way back into law school curricula
-

-

I
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The State Constitutions] Law Bulletin is published by the National Association of
Attorneys-General and the Council of State Governments. The National Associa
tion of Attorneys-General also inaugurated a new journal, Emerging Issues in
State Constitutional Law, in 1982.
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after a near-complete absence for several decades)5 Scholarly interest
is rapidly growing, lawjournals have published more articles on state
constitutional topics in the past five years than in the previous fifty.
Symposia, conferences and other events help spread the word.
A. Example 1: Public school finance
The patterns and dimensions of this revival can best be illustrated
with a few concrete examples. The first concerns constitutional norms
applicable to the system of fmancing public schools in the US. From its
beginnings in the nineteenth century, universal publicly fmanced edu
cation has always been primarily a concern of state government. As a
result, the US Constitution contains not a single word on the subject,
while nearly every state constitution has an entire article devoted to it.
Most states created local school districts, organised on a town or
village basis, to operate public schools, and funded them through local
property taxes. For decades concern has been growing in many parts of
the country about the disparity in funds available to support education
in property-rich and property-poor districts. For a variety of reasons
many state legislatures were unable to overcome their inertia to address
the issue, even when the disparities reached shocking levels.’6
The obvious basis for a constitutional challenge to this system
would have seemed to be at the state level. The typical state constitu
tion not only contains a general “equality of treatment” clause, but also
makes education a state (rather than a local) responsibility, and man
dates something like a “uniform”, or “thorough”, or “efficient” (adjec
tives vary) state public school system. But by the 1960s, state consti
tutions had well-nigh disappeared from the general legal culture, and
from the consciousness of most litigants. As a result, the option of
applying state constitutions was not given much consideration.
At that time, by contrast, the federal courts and the Federal Consti
tution seemed to offer more promise. Although the framers of the

15.

14.
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1 cannot recall, during my three year stint at Harvard Law School in the late
1960s, ever hearing state constitutions mentioned in any course on any subject;
certainly the standard courses in constitutional law dealt exclusively with the US
Constitution.
As in Texas, where the ratio of property value per pupil varied from district to
district by a factor of as much as 700 tel. Edgewood independent School Dial ‘jet
u Kirby 777 SW 2d 391, 392 (1989).
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Federal Constitution’s equal protection clause plainly did not have
equality in state public education foremost in their minds, the US
Supreme Court dramatically signalled its concern with equal educa
tional opportunity, at least in matters of race, in its famous decision in
Brown v Board of Education of Topeka17 (“Brown”) in 1954.
As a result, school finance reformers turned to the federal courts
and the Federal Constitution, challenging the gross differences in
school funding among Texas-school districts as a violation of equal
protection. But the Court was retreating from the activism signalled in
Brown, and by a 5:4 vote it turned back the challenge in San Antonio
Independent School District u Rodriguez’8 (“Rodriguez”) in 1973.
This setback proved only temporary for reformers. The California
Supreme Court had already held its school fmancing system unconsti
tutional under the equality clause of the state as well as the Federal
Constitution,’9 and in the years since Rodriguez high courts in nearly
half of the fifty states have evaluated their school finance systems
against the requirements of their state constitutions. About half of these
have declared their systems unconstitutional?
Many have relied not on general equality clauses in state constitu
tions but rather on more specific provisions targeted at education. One
of the latest state courts to do so is, ironically, Texas, the scene of the
earlier unsuccessful federal challenge. There the state Supreme Court
applied a constitutional provision requiring the legislature to make
“suitable” provision for an “efficient” statewide public school system

17.
18.

19.
20.

347 US 483 (1954).
411 US 1(1973). For more recent evidence of the US Supreme Court’s reluctance
to apply the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to state public
education, see Kadrmas u Dickinson Public Schools 487 US 450(1988) deciding
that a school bus user fee does not violate equal protection; compare Plyler u Doe
457 US 202(1982) which held that the state must make public education available
to children of illegal aliens on the same terms as other children in the state.
Serrano v PriestS Cal 3d 584, 487 p 2d 1241 (1971).
The state court decisions are collected and discussed in WE Thro “To Render
Them Safe: The Analysis of State Constitutional Provisions in Public School
Finance Reform Litigation” (1989)75 Va L Rev 1639; and MW Catalano and C
Modisher “State Constitutional Issues in Public School Funding Challenges”
(1989) 2 Emerg Issues in State Const Law 207. For a frank discussion of one state
high court Justice’s assessment of the judicial role in such cases, seeR Neely
How Courts Govern America (New Haven; Yale University Press, 1981) 16-17,
19-20 and 171-189.
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to throw out the existing financing structure.2’ As this shows, the
resurgence of state constitutional law is not confmed to applications of
the protections in formal bills of rights. Indeed, some of the most
interesting and important developments in state constitutional law have
not involved bills of rights or individual rights at all.
B.

Example 2: The right to privacy

It remains the case, however, that popular attention given to state
constitutional resurgence in the US has concentrated on the traditional
area of glamour constitutional protections for individual rights. One
such issue undergoing rich application and doctrinal development at
the state level is privacy, especially in civil matters.
In the Federal Constitution, the principal express privacy protec
tions apply in the criminal context, providing freedom from selfincrimination and from unreasonable searches and seizures. While a
federal constitutional right to civil privacy exists, it is one the US
Supreme Court has had to strain somewhat to fmd, in the “penumbra”
of various explicit constitutional guarantees and in emanations from
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment?2 The current
Court under Chief Justice Rehnquist has not shown interest in extend
ing federal constitutional protection for privacy; indeed, it has for the
most part engaged assiduously in pruning it?
Many state constitutions, by contrast, contain more explicit or tex
tually elastic protections for privacy. Arizona’s constitutional privacy
provision, for example, reads cryptically: “No person shall be disturbed
in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law72~
In case after case in the last decade, dozens of state supreme courts
have applied such privacy clauses in a variety of contexts contexts
from which the Federal Constitution has often been exiled by decisions
of the US Supreme Court. Among other things, state court decisions
have tried to reconcile privacy notions with emerging telecommunica
tions or other technologies (such as “caller ID” cordless telephones,
-

-

21.
22.
23.
24.

Edgewoodsupranl6.
Griswold supra n 6.
See, for example, Bowers v Hardwick 478 US 186 (1986); Webster u Reproduc
tive Health Services 109 set 3040 (1989).
Ariz Conat art II § 8.
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and ever more sophisticated tests for drug use);~ umpired collisions
between emerging medical technologies and an individual’s privacy
right in medical treatment decisions (the so-called “right to die”
cases);~ and addressed the rope of personal privacy in reproductive or
sexual behaviour or orientation (cases involving restrictions on or
public funding for abortion, and cases on sodomy or homosexuality)Y
The constitutional issues being raised in these kinds of cases are
controversial. They are on the cutting edge of constitutional law and
social change. As has frequently been the case in the US, the courts
have not hesitated to step up to meet the challenge of applying enduring
constitutional norms to new contexts. The dramatic difference in the
past few years, however, is that these are state courts, using state
constitutions, intellectually liberated from the teachings of the US
Supreme Court.

C.

Example 3: Protecting access to courts for damage
suits

Mother area where the state courts have found fertile constitutional
ground is in provisions protecting the right to sue for injuries. Some
state constitutions contain guarantees that the courts shall always be
open and available to supply remedies for every injury (so-called “open
courts” provisions). A few states, like Arizona, have considerably more
specific provisions. None of these has any counterpart in the text of the
US Constitution, and the US Supreme Court has shown little inclina
tion in modem times to apply the Federal Constitution (such as through

25.

26.
27.

See, for example, State v Gunwalt 720 p 2d 808; 106 Wash 2d 54 (1986). Inter
estingly, Justice David Souter, the newest member of the US Supreme Court (re
placing Justice William Brennan) wrote an opinion for the New Hampshire
Supreme Court expressing little interest in an argument that a “pen register” was
a search under the state constitution. See Stole v Valenzuekz 536 A 24 1252, 1259
(1987). His opinion collected cases on both sides of the issue.
See, for example, In the Matter of Karen Quintan 355 A 2d 647, 70 NJ 10(1976);
Rasmussen u Fleming 154 Arir 207, 741 p 2d 674 (1987).
See, for example, Moe v Secretazy ofAdminist ration and Finance 382 Mass 629,
4172 Ed 387(1981) (abortion funding); Right to Choose u Byrne 91 NJ 287,450
A 2d 925 (1982) (same); Gay Law Students Association u Pacific States Tele
graph and Telephone Co 156 Cal Rptr 14,595 p 2d 592(1979) (discrimination
against homosexua*

I
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the due process or equal protection clauses) to interfere with state
formulations of tort law.~
These state constitutional clauses have been much litigated in recent
years, often in the context of reviewing the constitutionality of “tort
reform” legislation such as attempts to place ceilings on damage
recovery, to adopt no-fault systems, or to provide immunities in certain
situations. Here too the results have varied considerably from state to
state and context to context. State constitutional clauses dealing with
equality or due process have sometimes figured in this litigation, but
for the most part the courts have concentrated on these “open courts”

provisions.~
These decisions involve the state courts quite heavily in the area of
economic regulation, and have sometimes thwarted legislative attempts
to limit liability or recovery. Because the cost of automobile, medical
malpractice, and other forms of insurance have climbed in recent years
in many places, some decisions have been controversial and provoked
proposals for constitutional amendments to overrule them.
This is, furthermore, one area of state constitutional law where

federal action has been proposed to overcome state constitutional
obstacles. Congress, spurred on by the Reagan Administration, has for
the past few years been considering enacting uniform federal standards
for product liability that would pre-empt state law, including state
constitutional limitations.
There is no doubt about Congress’ power to do so. It may override
state constitutional provisions in many contexts, under broad federal
constitutional provisions like the interstate commerce clause, coupled
with the supremacy clause.m & far, however, opponents of tort reform,
defenders of state constitutions, and advocates of states’ rights have
prevailed, and even the limited incursion on state constitutions found
in the products liability proposal has foundered in Congress.

28.

29.

30.

See Martinez v California 444 US 277, 482(1980); compare Pacific Mutual Life
Insurance Co u Haslip 553 So 2d 537 (1989), cert granted, 59 USLW 3023
(1990), argued 3 October 1990 (constitutionaiity of state law award of punitive
damages under due process abuse of fourteenth amendment of Federal Constitu
tion).
See, for example, Boswell u Phoenix Newspapers Inc 152 Ariz 9, 730; p 2d 186
(1986); Carson v Maurer 120 NH 925,424 A 2d 825(1980); Ktuger u White 281
So 2d 1 (1973).
USConstartl*8c1 17;artVlcl2.
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D. Example 4: Policing the separation of powers
State courts have long played a role in enforcing constitutionally
mandated separation of powers among the branches of state govern
ment. Most state constitutions are, in fact, considerably more emphatic
on the subject than the US Constitution, even though the basic
constitutional ideas are the same at both levels. Yet here too the state
courts in recent years have shown new vigour in dealing with these
issues.
One example involves the state courts fending oft what they per
ceive are legislative encroachments on their powers to regulate such
things as the rules of evidence, the practice of law and the operation of
the courts. Of course, the tort reform cases described in the previous
example also involve legislative restrictions on thejudicial process, but
those court decisions are more rooted in specific constitutional clauses
such as the “open courts” provisions. Here, on the other hand, the
decisions rest more generally on the notion that the courts have
inherent power, arising directly from the separation of powers over
evidence, regulating attorneys, and administering thejudicial branch.
Such issues very rarely emerge at the federal level because the
federal judiciary almost never claims such inherent power. State courts
do, however, and the boundaries of this power are fairly often litigated
at the state level.31

I
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III.REASONS UNDERLYING THE STATE
CONSTITUTIONAL RESURGENCE IN THE
UNITED STATES
Perhaps the most useful way to explore what relevance the revival
of US state constitutional law might have for Australia is to identifS’ the
major factors underlying it.

A. Limiting the impact of the United States Supreme
Court’s rightward tilt
Certainly one reason for the revival and the one usually first seized
upon by extreme partisans for and against it unabashedly seeks a
particular substantive result, Those favouring an expansion ofjudi
cially protected individual liberties now look to state constitutions and
state courts primarily in reaction to the retreat of the Reagan/Rehnquist
Supreme Court. They perceive the state courts as offering the opportu
nity to retain and expand judicial protections that are being limited and
dissolved as a matter of federal constitutional law.m
The notion of relying on state constitutions for these protections is
-

-

especially attractive to civil libertarians. State supreme court decisions

applying state constitutions are not, generally speaking, subject to
review or limitation by the US Supreme Court because of the “adequate
and independent state ground” doctrine?3 This is not, however, wholly
true. State constitutional decisions expanding individual liberty may
eventually collide with federal constitutional rights and, under the US
Constitution’s supremacy clause, have to recede. Thus a state
constitutional decision protecting the right to engage in political activ
ity on someone else’s private property, such as a private shopping mall,
could conceivably interfere with the federal constitutional rights of the
property owner. In this particular context, however, the constitutional
analysis becomes quite subtle, illustrating how intertwined state and

32.
31.

See, for example, American Trial Lawyers Association u New Jersey Supreme
Court 66 NJ 258,330 A 2d 350(1974); Commonwealth; ax rel Carroll u Tate 442
Pa 45, 274 A 2d 193 (197fl; People u McKenna 585 P 2d 275 (1978).

Indeed, the leading civil libertarian on the US Supreme Court, recently-retired
Justice William Brennan, was among the first to call attention to the role state
constitutions and state courts could play in this context, in his article “State

33.

Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights” (1977) 90 Harv L Rev 489.
See Michigan u Long 463 US 1032(1983).
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federal constitutional law can become, and how complex the interplay
between state and federal constitutional law can be in the US federal

system.
Federal constitutional law protecting property rights typically de
fers to state law for defining the content of those property rights. If
state property law does not aocord the shopping mall owner the right to
exclude those who wish to engage in political speech on the premises,
then the federal constitutional protection for property rights will gen
erally respect that state law limitation and not enlarge the scope of
those property rights?4
As noted earlier, state court decisions resting upon state constitutional
grounds are reviewable by the High Court in Australia. Perhaps,
therefore, the notion of state constitutional law as a counterweight to
federal constitutional law is not as applicable in Australia.
B.

The “New Federalism” resuscitating the power of
the states
-

Although much of the attention focused on the revival of US state
constitutional law has played up conflicting decisions between the
federal and state courts on constitutional civil liberties, it is a serious
mistüe to conceive of the revival solely in those terms. Indeed, some
of the more interesting trends have little or nothing to do with that
field.
This points up the second factor underlying the revival of state
constitutional law in the US: what some call the “new federalism” an
across-the-board renewal of interest in state and local governments as
a source of creative solutions to social problems. This is of course an
old idea, perhaps most vividly captured by Justice Louis Brandeis in
his famous reference to the “happy feature” of federalism that allows
the state and local governments to serve as “laboratories” for eco
nomic, social, and political experiments that can, should, and do
influence federal policy making?4 In modern times its appeal has been
enhanced by the growing perception of a sprawling federal presence
creating an increasingly stifling uniformity.
-

19901

Robins u Pruneyard Shopping Center 447 US 74 (1980).
New Stale Ice Company v Liebmann 285 US 262,311(1932) Brandeis J dissent
ing; see also Truax u Corrigan 257 US 312,344(1921) Holmes J dissenting.
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In fact, state courts have long served as laboratories of constitutional
law, influencing the Supreme Court’s view of the Federal Constitu
tion.~ Although too often forgotten by lawyers who came of age when
the federal courts and the Federal Constitution monopolised the spot
light, over much of the two centuries of the country’s existence there
was a decided amount of intellectual cross-fertilization between state
and federal courts, and state and federal constitutions.
The states’ value as constitutional laboratories is demonstrated not
just in judicial interpretations but in constitutional processes them
selves. For example, more than forty states provide their chief execu
tives with a constitutional right to veto single or “line” items in an
omnibus legislative act appropriating money for various purposes. This
power, denied the President by the United States Constitution, has been
a frequent subject of political discussion at the national level in recent
years as the political system seems unable to deal with our continuing
large budget deficits. The discussion is richer, and better informed, by
the actual experience provided by the state constitutions.
From a political standpoint, the “new federalism” reason for state
constitutional resurgence coexists somewhat uncomfortably with the
idea that state constitutions offer a refuge for the political left. In
modern times, it has been the political right in the United States that
has emphasised the primacy of local over national responsibility for
most social questions. The idea of local control, in other words, gives
the right its own reason to support development of state constitutional
law.
State constitutions, and state court decisions applying those consti
tutions, are not only more susceptible to local control, they do not
perforce apply nationwide. Rather, they must compete in the intellec
tual and political marketplace if they are to find acceptance outside
their own states.
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Over time, a growing diversity of state constitutional decisions may
loosen the US Supreme Court’s application of the Federal Constitution
to the states. That Court might be persuaded to lower the “floor” of
protection provided to individual rights by its application of the Bill of
Rights to the states. At least it might become more flexible and
deferential to state court balancing of the needs of the state versus those
of the individual. Ultimately, in short, an increased reliance on state
constitutions may diminish the reach and importance of the Federal
Constitution, and the US Supreme Court’s authority in interpreting it.
The idea that constitutional federalism allows the left and right
sides of the political spectrum to swap institutional weapons is not new,
of course. Numerous state constitutional provisions around the turn of
this century were drafted in reaction to what their framers perceived as
the unacceptable tilt rightward by the US Supreme Court Later on, the
right sought reftige in state courts and state constitutions, while the left
perceived them as, for the most part, bastions of conservatism, and
sought assistance from federal courts interpreting the Federal Constitu
tion. Today the pendulum is once again swinging back.
This suggests, not incidentally, another important constitutional
commonality between our two countries. Thomson has, for example,
noted that “[e]bb and flow has also characterized the relative standing
of national and state constitutions” in Australia. Thus in Australia too,
“state constitutions and constitutional law have experienced periods of
obscurity and prominence.’tm
In a broader sense, the new federalism aspect of the revival of state
constitutional law simply celebrates the diversity of the states and of
the country’s experience. The great English commentator James Biyce
was struck by what he called the “pictorial” nature of American state
constitutions. These charters, drafted at many different times through
our country’s history, disclose much about the “actual methods and
conduct of government;” indeed, according to Bryce, they provide “the
most instructive sources for the history of popular government.t~E As
another early state constitutional commentator put it, “the romance, the

•

37.

Supra n 1, 1234.

38.

J Bryce The American Commonwealth 3rd edn (New York: Macmillan, 1906)

450, 458.

I

LESSONS FOR AUSTRALIA?

1990]

389

poetry, and even the drama of American politics are deeply embedded
in the [American] state constitutions.’~°
It is not only fun but useful to discover that Vermont, with its
stereotypical image of taciturnity, has the shortest state constitution.~
Or that Alabama, reveffing in the Gothic politics of the deep south, has
a constitution nearly twenty times longer, and one that has been
amended nearly four hundred times in this century.4’ The pictorial
drama is, moreover, continually unfolding. Some twenty states have
amended their constitutions in modern times to forbid discrimination
on the basis of gender. A handful of states have adopted some sort of
constitutional right to a healthy environmentC
Such diversity extends to state courts as well as to the constitutions
themselves. Two leading observers of state constitutional resurgence in
the US have noted flatly that “there is no typical state supreme court.”
Rather, the state high courts tend to develop their own distinctive
“institutional identities.”3
It is important to note that this celebration of diversity through a
focus on state constitutions has not proved to be a serious threat to the
national economic integration that has proceeded practically without
interruption over the last several decades. The constitutional basis for
national economic, social, and environmental regulation has not been
seriously questioned by the US Supreme Court since the early 1930s,
despite its recent sharp turn to the right in other areas.
...
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State supreme courts, even as they are flexing their state constitutional
muscles in other areas, have likewise, for the most part, not seriously
impaired this powerful, probably inexorable trend. If threats material
ise, of course, the federal government has a ready remedy pre-emptive
legislation. As the current national debate over products liability legis
lation shows, however, the “political safeguards of federalism” are
powerful protective forces for states’ prerogatives, including state con
stitutions.44
This experience suggests that developments in Australia which
seem to strengthen the federal constitutional case for national regula
tion, such as the Franklin Dam case’5 need not, of themselves, under
mine the benefits of focusing on state constitutions.~ In fact, just the
opposite might be happening in the US. The comparative loss of states’
control over their economies may be heightening the value, politically
and culturally, of state assertions of constitutional independence in
other areas.
-

C. Breaking up the United States Supreme Court’s
monopoly on constitutional law
A third justification for state constitutional revival is also closely
bound up with federalism and with a fundamental concept upon which
it rests. This is the idea, most often identified with Montesquieu and the
framers of the US Constitution, of dispersing power among govern
mental layers and units as a means of restraining government and
thereby promoting liberty.47
In the context under discussion, the idea translates into a distrust of
a single court monopolising constitutional interpretation. The idea of
legislative and executive power being divided between state and na
tional institutions is everywhere readily accepted in the US; basically
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the same justification exists for having different centres ofjudicial
power over constitutional values. Ultimately, in short, a dialogue
emanating from many supreme courts is better, and safer, than a mono
logue from the US Supreme Court.
In the Australian context; where the executive and legislative branches
are substantially united under the tradition of responsible government,
this argument for more dispersion of power might carry even more
weight. On the other hand, in Australia the High Court has the power
to review and reverse the decisions of the highest courts in the states
even on matters of state constitutional law. At least as a formal matter,
then, the state high courts cannot, absent federal constitutional change,
exist as truly independent centres ofjudicial power. However, to the
extent it is persuaded that there is a benefit from dispersing judicial
power over constitutional norms, the High Court could refrain from
vigilant review of state court decisions enforcing state constitutions.
Moreover, states do have room to act to reinstate state court constitutional
interpretations, after the High Court has disagreed, by amending the
state constitution. In effect then, states can override High Court deci
sions on state constitutional law.
D. Carrying out the intent of the framers of the state
constitutions
A fourth rationale for taking US state constitutions seriously is
simply to carry out the intent of their framers. The drafters of these
state charters expected that the constitutional structure and safeguards
they were creating would be the bottom-line determinants of the
boundaries of governmental power and individual liberty. Like the
“new federalism” notion discussed earlier, this notion of faithfulness to
the framers’ expectation is also usually identified with a conservative

credo.
There can be no doubt in the US about the expectations of the
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framers of nearly all state constitutions. State and federal constitutions
deal with many of the same subjects, but the constitutional texts are
rarely identical. This suggests that the meanings of counterpart but
textually different provisions are not identical. This view is reinforced

by the individual histories of most state constitutions, which reveal
beyond peradventure a general attitude of independence from the
Federal Constitution. The decided tendency of state constitutional draf
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ters was to look much more closely to other state constitutions as
models rather than to the Federal ~
Thirteen state constitutions preceded the Federal Constitution and
thus necessarily stood, when they were drafted, as the sole source of
constitutional law for their citizens° Although all the state constitu
tions that followed these original thirteen were drafted against the
backdrop of the Federal Constitution, they were largely unaffected by

it.
These subsequent constitutions were mostly fashioned at a time
when the US Supreme Court was interpreting most provisions of the
Federal Constitution to leave broad latitude for state power and state
constitutional law. These Court-imposed limitations on the Federal
Constitution went beyond the simple fact that most protections of the
Federal Bill of Rights were not deemed applicable to the states until
well into the twentieth centwy, when the process of incorporating them
into the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment accelerated
dramatically under Chief Justice Earl WarrenYe They also extended to
the Court’s interpretation of a variety of other constitutional provi
sions, including the interstate commerce clause, the equal protection
clause, and the limitations on federal court justiciability derived from
Article III.
Thus the framers of most state constitutions found it only natural to
assume that their charters would provide not only the basic framework
of, but also the primary limitations on, state government. What is more
remarkable is that this notion of independence from the Federal Con
stitution remains pronounced among drafters of modem state constitu
tions. The newer state constitutions, including those from states both
old (Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Montana, North Carolina and Virginia
have adopted new constitutions in the last twenty years) and relatively
new (Alaska and Hawaii were admitted to the union with new consti
tutions in 1959), have not deferred to federal constitutional ideas, even
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though they were drafted at a time when those ideas were invading a
lot of territory previously outside the bounds of federal constitutional
law. The high courts in these states have also, for the most part, acted
accordingly. Both the Alaskan and Hawaiian Supreme Courts, for
example, have issued noteworthy decisions enforcing state constitutional
rights to privacy.51
Therefore, looking to state constitutions as the primary source of
constitutional law is consistent with their framers’ expectations, re
gardless of when they were drafted.
E. The improved quality of state judiciaries
A few other considerations are worth mentioning, even though they
are not usually offered as justification for the resurgence of state
constitutional law in the US. Many states have acted in the past few
decades to upgrade the quality of their judiciaries. A number have
changed judicial selection methods to limit the role of partisan politics.
Around the turn of the century, for example, over two-thirds of the
states elected state high court justices; currently, fewer than half do.~
Many states have improved judicial salaries to add attraction to the
position. Some have enlarged the independence ofjudges by, for
example, lengthening terms of office.
Well over one-third of the states have adopted some version of
“merit selection;” usually, some variant of the so-called “Missouri
plan”, where judges are appointed after some form of relatively bipar
tisan merit review and thereafter periodically stand before the voters in
a nonpartisan, “yes-no” retention election. State supreme courts now
generally have more discretionary control over the kinds of cases they
review. They are also generally better staffed, financed and admini
stered.~
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Although it would admittedly be difficult to prove by empirical
methods, such changes have probably made thejudiciaries in many
states more receptive to principled arguments for independent state
constitutional interpretations.TM

F
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The relevance of this feature to Australia is doubtful. Federal courts
and other institutions in Australia can resolve issues of state constitutional
law more readily than in United States, and state courts may be losing
some authority over issues of federal law. As Thomson puts it:
In Australiajurisdictional impairment and vulnerability is afflicting state, not
federal, courts. Almost simultaneously state courts are being deprived of
federal jurisdiction, and federal courts are acquiring jurisdiction to determine
state law issues.M

State courts routinely handle much federal
constitutional litigation already

Another consideration relevant to state constitutional activism is the
underappreciated fact that state court judges in the US are on the front
lines of making much federal constitutional law. In fact, most cases
raising questions of federal constitutional law originate in state, not
federal, courts. Therefore, state judges address and decide federal
constitutional issues much more than federal judges (underneath the
US Supreme Court) do.
The reason for this is that most cases raising federal constitutional
issues are criminal cases where the accused routinely argues, among
other things, that the state has violated the Federal Bill of Rights. There
is relatively little substantive federal criminal law; as a result, the vast
bulk of criminal prosecutions are brought in state courts for violations
of state laws. Most of the US Supreme Court decisions in the last few
decades dealing with the rights of the criminally accused have involved
review of state court decisions!5
If state courts are trusted to be on the front lines in applying federal
constitutional law, the argument runs, it is difficult to argue that these
same courts ought to be deemed incompetent to address issues arising
under state constitutions.

54.
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IV. THE RELEVANCE (OR LACK THEREOF) OF
THE REL4TWE EASE OF AMENDING STATE
CONSTITUTIONSAND REPLACING STATE
COURT JUDGES
US state constitutions are generally much easier to amend (or re
place) than the Federal Constitution. Although procedures can differ
markedly from state to state, most state constitutions require legislative
proposals and popular approval to amend. In many states only a simple
majority in both the legislature and among the electorate is required, in
sharp contrast to the Federal Constitution, which requires approval by
two-thirds of each house of Congress and three-quarters of the states.
A sizeable minority of states also allows citizens to amend constitu
tions directly by popular initiative, bypassing legislatures?
The upshot of this is that an extraordinary political effort is usually
not required to amend state constitutions, as actual experience shows.
The US Constitution has been amended 26 times in slightly more than
two hundred years. Most state constitutions have been amended far
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more frequently. In two hundred years of state constitution-making,
state constitutions have been amended nearly five thousand times.
Thirty states have replaced their original constitutions with new ones,
some as many as eleven times. The average state constitution is 82
years old and has been amended 94 times.~’ Moreover, despite the trend
away from selecting state court judges by partisan elections, most state
judges must still periodically stand before the voters!~
It is difficult to say whether, and how, the relative ease of amend
ment and ouster of state judges might influence judicial behaviour.
Because it makes judicial interpretations more easily “correctable” by
the electorate, it may embolden state courtjudges to be more independ
ent and even frankly experimental in their constitutional judgments.
On the other hand, by subjecting the process of constitutional inter
pretation to a more direct political check and the spectre of frequent
reversal at the polls, it may lead judges to exercise more caution in their
judgments. Indeed, the safest course of action for state court judges
may often be simply to defer to and march in step with the US Supreme
Court in interpreting the state constitutions.
Some of this restraint may be owed simply to human nature. One
rarely enjoys seeing one’s carefully considered judgments, especially
those explained in writing and designed to persuade, rebuffed by
others. In some cases, moreover, a judge’s job might be in jeopardy.
But there are deeper, less personal concerns at stake. The authority of
the constitution as a fundamental charter, and of the judiciary as its
prime expositor, rests on the power of the bench to command popular
respect for its processes and judgments. The fear is that the more
frequently the people “rise up” to strike down judicial interpretations
of constitutional law, the less respect the constitution and the bench
will command. That, in turn, would undermine the independence of the
bench and the integrity of the judicial process.
Of course, judicial judgments interpreting statutes or the common
law are quite frequently reversed by legislatures, yet few argue that this
undermines respect for the judiciary and the rule of law. In almost
every state in the US, however, reversal of state court constitutional
judgments requires not just legislative action, but a popular vote.
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Moreover, the provisions for electing, retaining or recalling judges
found in many states likewise call for some kind of popular vote. This
gives the people at large a rare opportunity to express themselves
directly on judicial performance and constitutional values.
Some are troubled by the very idea of direct popular referenda on
judicial performance and individual decisions. Some are particularly
concerned in light of the respectable (and growing) body of opinion in
the US that holds that political campaigns generally are too dominated
by media and image manipulation, ten to thirty second “sound bites”,
and other techniques that retard rather than advance public understand
ing of important issues. These considerations make many, particularly
many lawyers and judges, nervous about the prospect of frequent
popular referenda on judicial decisions.
The modern revival of state constitutional law in the US has seen a
few notable instances of popular outcry, leading to constitutional
amendment or other direct political action against particular judicial
decisions. The Florida, California, and Massachusetts constitutions
have been amended in the last few years to cut back on some specific
state court decisions expanding the scope of individual freedoms under
the state constitution. In a few cases, voters approved constitutional
amendments providing for the death penalty after the courts had held
it inconsistent with state constitutions and approved amendments fash
ioning crude, “shotgun” marriages tying the interpretation of specific
state constitutional provisions to US Supreme Court interpretations of
counterpart federal provisions.W Individual judges on a few state courts
have faced hard-fought election contests for retention, where the oppo
sition was at least partially grounded on the judges’ state constitutional
decisions. In the most celebrated case, three members of the California
Supreme Court were soundly defeated in a retention election.6’
60.
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Yet it is easy to make too much of this. First, consider the numbers.
Only a very tiny fraction (certainly well under one per cent) of the
thousands of state constitutional decisions rendered since the modern
resurgence got underway has been the subject of any serious political
or popular attention at all. Of these few subject to popular questioning,
far fewer have been subject to organised efforts aimed at overturning
them or turning their makers out of office. Only a minority of such
attempts at reversal have actually succeeded. Indeed, in only a handilil
of the fifty states have any state constitutional decisions registered on
the most discriminating scale of political sensitivity in recent years.
Although most state constitutions have frequently been amended,
very few amendments have aimed at reversing judicial decisions. For
example, only three or four of the one hundred-plus amendments to the
Arizona Constitution have been prompted by judicial decision. None
has involved individual rights decisions or been particularly controver
sial.
Most state constitutional amendments come about for other reasons.
State constitutions tend to contain much more detail than the Federal
Constitution, and many amendments are necessary to correct technical
defects or instances where specificity has been rendered obsolete or
unworkable by the passage of time. Amendments to remove or create
new limits on legislative action are a popular subject, as are amend
ments to restructure executive or judicial branches to reflect demo
graphic, economic, and other changes.
By contrast, amendments in the glowing, noble, elastic principles
that are fruitful sources of creativejudicial application are relatively
rare. Indeed, state bills of rights are typically among the least-amended
provisions of state constitutions!2
The subject matter at the root of these reversals has also to be con
sidered. By far the most prominent subject ofjudicial decisions that
provoked popular outcry concerned the rights of those accused of
crimes and the closely related subject of capital punishment. Criminal
defendants generally have not commanded much popular favour in the
best of times, and public concern about crime fuels hostility to court
decisions perceived as “coddling” criminals. The rejection of the three
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California justices was not, according to most knowledgeable observ
ers, a referendum on state constitutional activism. Rather, it was voter
hostility to what it perceived as thosejustices’ refusal to acknowledge
the constitutionality of capital punishment. Californians had, a few
years earlier, overwhelmingly approved an amendment to the state
Constitution reinstating capital punishment after the Court had struck
it down!2
This is not to deny the negative effects that can result from subject
ing constitutional rights to popular referendum. Nor is it to deny that
one of the most important features of US constitutionalism, state and
federal, is its code of protections for persons suspected of crimes. Nor
is it to deny that judicial decisions may corrode public support even
when they do not inspire organised opposition. It is to say, however,
that those constitutional decisions inspiring popular outcry are actually
narrowly confined, by numbers and subject matter. One may fairly
question the extent to which this kind of outcry undermines the rule of
law, or the credibility of the bench, in general.
Many more state constitutional decisions with far-reaching impacts
have, by contrast, been met with little disapproval, and some have
commanded wide popular support. In the down or so states where the
courts have struck down entrenched systems of financing public schools,
for example, the state legislatures have generally responded not by
proposing constitutional amendments, but rather by legislation over
hauling the rmancing system to correct the violation.
Measured by almost any standard, the US statejudicianjs success
rate at making its constitutional decisions “stick” is very high indeed.
In short, the relative ease of amending state constitutions and the fre
quen~’ with which they are amended is deceptive.
In seeking to extract lessons from this for Australia, some of this
ready acceptance is surely traceable to the fairly high tolerance in the
US forjudicial activism in general, and therefore may not be easily ex
portable. But it may suggest that state constitutional decision-making
can be valuable and popular in and of itself, by tapping into and
combining traditions of local control, the rule of law, separation of
powers, and the value of careful decision-making with results ex
plained in writing, that grows out of an orderly, adversary process.
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V. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE FAILURE OF THE
BORIC NOMINATION TO THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT
Mother way of assessing popular opinion on constitutional prin
ciples, and the role ofthejudiciary in interpreting and applying them,
was provided by the national debate on President Reagan’s nomination
of Judge Robert Bork to the US Supreme Court in 1987.
By tacit agreement of fork supporters, opponents, and the nominee
himself, this debate largely focused upon the broad question of how
judges should approach cases involving constitutional issues and in
deed, upon the role of the courts in American life. The process was
quite extraordinary. The hearings before the Senate Judiciary Commit
tee were televised from gavel to gavel on cable television and received
enormous coverage in the general media. It might well have been the
most intensive, open inquliy into the subject of constitutional values in
US history. As a leading legal historian recently put it: “For a mass
media era, the Bork hearings came as close to a serious and fhndanien
tal consideration of constitutional direction as we have ever had in
America. In some sense, it was no less than a constitutional referen
dum.’~
The result was not just the rejection of Judge Bork: in the end, that
might have been the least of its impact. Rather, the process signalled a
rather widespread popular reaffirmation of the notion ofjudicial review
and the value ofjudicial expression of constitutional values.
It is noteworthy that much of the focus of the Bork inquiry was on
constitutional issues other than those involving the rights of criminal
defendants. Bork opponents (as fork himself had, in his previous
writings) concentrated in particular on his opposition to a civil right of
privacy: a right that, as noted earlier, the Supreme Court had implied
into the Constitution in Griswold in 1965, ruling that a state could not
outlaw the distribution or use of contraceptives.tm To Bork, the Griswold
decision typified everything wrong with modern constitutional inter
...
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pretation; to his opponents, his opposition typified everything wrong
with his constitutional philosophy.~
To the extent a philosophy of constitutional interpretation can be
said to prevail in such an encounter in a frankly political forum, it was
the Bork opponents who carried the day. Not only did a substantial
majority of Senators vote on the record against his nomination, but they
did it in the face of strong support from one of the most popular
Presidents in this century. In a basic way, the Bork hearings showed
that popular values had caught up with many of the constitutional
innovations of the Warren Court. In Horwitz’s words, the Bork defeat
dramatically illustrated that a “constitutional consensus” had been
fonned “around the view that cherished personal rights were somehow
embedded in the Constitution~t? (and, implicitly, that they should be
enforced by the courts),
In the struggle for control of the US Supreme Court, it seems clear
that although the conservatives lost the Bork battle, they won the war.
The person who eventually assumed the seat Bork was nominated for,
Anthony Kennedy, has so far proved generally as conservative as
Bork,~ and a new conservative has replaced the Court’s most promi
nent and influential stalwart on the left, Justice Brennan.
But the Bork episode may have important influence, ironically, on
the direction of state constitutional law in the US. Specifically, while
the centre of the storm over Bork was the Federal Constitution and the
Supreme Court, the Bork defeat’s affirmation of the value of creative
constitutional interpretation encourages state supreme courts to play a
more aggressive role in articulating state constitutional values.
Perhaps in Australia, too, courts have a reservoir of public good
will upon which to draw in enforcing constitutional values in contro
versial settings. Thomson has observed that an “I a]lmost unqualified
approval of state courts has been the salient feature of Australian
judicial experience~ On the other hand, Galligan has suggested that
...
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Australian High Court decisions like the Franklin Dam case7° have
“alienated powerful sections of Lthe Court’sl elite constituency.”7’
The Bork episode suggests that alienation has a way of healing
itself, if the judiciary is correct in assessing the way the country is
heading, and has sufficient public support to sustain it until the public
opinion that counts (whether it is of an elite or the masses) catches up
to its innovations.

VI.OPPOSITION TO STATE CONSTITUTIONAL
REVIVAL IN THE UNITED STATES
An examination of some of the arguments made in opposi
tion to the revival of state constitutional Jaw in the US may
also help illuminate whatever lessons the US experience may
hold for Australia. Let there be no mistake, however. The
opponents of the revival have lost their battle; indeed, they
have been swept from the field in nearly every jurisdiction.
This is not to say that state courts believe the Federal Constitution
and federal court decisions construing it have nothing of relevance to
say about their own constitutions. It is to say, however, that the notion
that federal constitutional decisions presumptively control what the
state constitutions mean an attitude that dominated most state court
thinking for several decades has been rejected by a consensus of state
high courts.
It is also to suggest that this position has popular appeal in the US.
Indeed, one might frankly doubt whetl~er a prospective nominee to any
state high court who vocally opposed taking an independent view of the
state constitution could be nominated or, if subject to a confirmation
process, be confirmed.
Most of the principal grounds for opposition have been implied in
the previous discussion. Political conservatives and opponents ofjudi
cial review generally have criticized state constitutional revival as
constituting sheer unprincipled reaction to the ReaganlRehnquist Court
retrenchment. As I have indicated, there is some truth in that observa
tion. But there is room to doubt whether the legitimacy of
state constitutional decision-making is destroyed because it
-

-
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judicial or constitutional forum shopping. Certainly the Reagan Ad
ministration’s approach to federal constitutional decision making
(through itsjudicial appointments and its advocacy before the federal
bench) has been stridently reactive. A basic purpose of federalism, and
the dispersal of somewhat overlapping powers it frequently embodies,
is to allow for flexibility and diversity. Different constitutional results
at the state level can serve this purpose, and are not objectionablejust
because they are different.
Secondly, opponents have argued the advantages of having a single,
uniform national constitutional law, especially in certain contexts. It
may be awkward, for example, to have two sets of constitutional
restraints on the police’s power to investigate, search and arrest,
especially because state and federal police frequently engage in joint
activities. It is not surprising, therefore, to find state prosecutors and
other conservatives on the rights of the criminally accused in the
vanguard of opposition to reviving state constitutional law.
But the argument that centralized authority is more efficient is, of
course, precisely one of the reasons that led Montesquieu and the US
founding fathers to promote separation of powers. Lord Acton’s dictum
that “[pJower tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts abso
lutely”72 still remains the bedrock of US (and, though perhaps to a
lesser extent, Australian) political philosophy.
Even if this dispersion of power over constitutional values creates,
on some issues, a babble of discordant voices, one may still argue that
this is preferable to sticking with one constitutional voice, right or
wrong. Indeed, differences frankly expressed in written judicial opin
ions help illuminate the truth, as they must compete in the marketplace
of ideas, a market that has value here as it does in more conventional
settings)3
Another expressed concern about state constitutional resurgence in
the US is that it risks a loss of national unity. The fear is that 51.
different varieties of constitutional law can unduly strain the social
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fabric. The objective ought to be to arrive at a single national position
on many important constitutional issues, and that is not possible if state
courts go their own separate ways.
There are several possible responses to this. Supporters of the
revival argue that whatever constitutional unity is desirable can be
largely achieved by means of the federal “floor” created by US Su
preme Court applications of the Federal Bill of Rights to the states.
State freedom of action to raise state constitutional rights above this
floor, the argument goes, cannot seriously imperil the cause of national
unity. In Australia, of course, judicial uniformity is achievable through
direct review by the High Court of state constitutional decisions. But
in both countries, state constitutions may be explicitly amended to
reinstate diversity, even if the courts interpret state provisions to be
uniform with national constitutional norms.
Secondly, as noted earlier, national economic unity has not been
seriously threatened by the revival of state constitutional law in the US.
Moreover, the national legislature has ample tools to deal with it, such
as a broad power to pre-empt state constitutional rules.
Thirdly, it might be disputed whether unity of constitutional think
ing is really an important objective. To the contrary, diversity of
opinions a matter on which Americans pride themselves in so many
other areas of life may be more desirable. To return to the marketplace
idea, plainly US policy is to disfavour monopolies in other parts of
society. Should constitutional law and constitutional values be differ
ent?

VII.

-

-
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SOME CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
Some features of the state constitutional resurgence in the US seem

to warrant special note in Australia. First, as the subject of a more
formal, self.contained constitutional bill of rights continues to be
discussed at federal and state levels in Australia,74 the jurisprudence
that the US states are developing under their own bills of rights may
help inform Australian discussions of such important constitutional
values as free speech, privacy, and due process of law.
Perhaps differences in constitutional result from state to state have
no effect on the crime rate, or conviction rate for those accused of
crime, or the quality of the environment, or the level of political
activity, or the overall quality of life, or the general strength of the
social fabric. It would be exceedingly difficult to explore these ques
tions by systematic, careful scholarly study because of the high num
bers of variables that would have to be controlled. No one to my
knowledge has yet tried.
Perhaps, in the end, a careful comparison of constitutional law
among different states and with the US Constitution would suggest two
things. First, while differences in detail are the norm, there is, consid
ered broadly, a remarkable consensus among American states on
important constitutional values. What Hartz called America’s liberal
tradition is expressed as well in its state constitutions as it is in any
other aspect of American life.Th Or, as a leading legal historian recently
warned in examining the history of state constitutions and state courts
in the criminal justice context, it may be a mistake
to draw too sharp a line between state and national behavior. Each state, to be
sure, has its own history, tradition, and habits. But everywhere, courts were
exposed to the same dominant strands of legal culture, and they reacted to the

great trends and events in the world around them.’6
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The meaning of the disparities that do exist among constitutional
policies in various states may be more symbolic than practical. Perhaps
it makes relatively little difference in the day to day lives of ordinary
citizens whether one state places restraints on police behaviour, or
protects the freedom to speak in a private shopping mall, and another
does not. But even if the impact on society of constitutional outcomes
is mostly unquantifiable, indeed inexpressible, it may still be real.
Mother issue that bears more attention concerns the possible impact
on constitutionalism of the Australian system of responsible govern
ment, as compared with the US system that allows (indeed in recent
years has actually made commonplace) divided governments. The US
system, at both the national and state levels (though perhaps more
pronounced in the former), creates an enormous amount of legislative
inertia toward the status quo. Many observers and participants in the
US political scene have noted the difficulty of enacting legislation. The
lack of enforced party loyalty, and divisions between the executive and
the legislature, require much negotiation, compromise, and eventual
consensus. It is far easier to stop legislation from being enacted than it
is to enact it.
This means
impasses are frequent, where a sufficient agreement
is lacking and sufficient tact and leadership is not forthcoming. This
may be the case even where there is general agreement that something
ought to be done but no consensus exists on the nature of the solution.
The unsatisfactory status quo may linger for years, even decades.
In some such cases, the US tradition of an active judiciary, the
general acceptance ofjudicial review, and the elasticity of US consti
tutions can combine to allow the judicial branch to dictate, to some
extent, the legislative agenda. This judicial intrusion, through
constitutional enforcement, is often enough to break through the inertia
and force a solution. The school finance cases described earlier are an
example of this, and others abound.
Perhaps in Australia there is less “need” for such judicial intrusions
on constitutional grounds. The much stronger tradition of party loyalty
and the constitutional (or quasi-constitutional) idea of responsible
government reduce the chances for deadlock, or at least remove the
deadlock somewhat from the purview ofjudicial scrutiny through
constitutional enforcement.
A final aspect of US constitutional federalism does not involve
direct application of state constitutions. It does, however, draw on a
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source that helps sustain the resurgence of state constitutionalism;
namely, the growing confidence of the US state courts in their ability
to make valuable, independent constitutional judgments in enforcing
the Federal Constitution as well as their own. As noted earlier, federal
courts have sometimes disabled themselves from enforcing certain
provisions of the Federal Constitution. Before the US Supreme Court’s
pathbrealcing decision in Baker u Carr7 malapportionment at all levels
of government was not subject to federal court scrutiny under the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
A rather similar situation exists today with respect to another
federal constitutional provision with potentially important implications
for state governments in the United States. This is the so-called “Guar
antee Clause” of Article IV, section 4, which obligates the US to “guar
antee to every State in the Union a Republican Form of Government....”
The Supreme Court has not illuminated the meaning of that clause. For
nearly a century it has taken the firm position that the federal courts
have no power to enforce it.7°
it is not generally appreciated, inside as well as outside the US, that
state courts are not bound by such judgments of the US Supreme Court,
even though they concern a matter of fedetal constitutional law. That
is, state courts can interpret and apply the Federal Constitution in
circumstances where the federal courts will refrain from doing so. The
justiciability limits that the US Supreme Court imposes on the federal
courts cannot constitutionally be applied to the state courts because of
their independent sovereignty. Under the same reasoning, the state
courts can also decide cases involving federal constitutional issues
where the plaintiff does not have standing to raise those issues in
federal courts, or where the case would be regarded as moot if brought
in federal courts.
Moreover, these state court judgments, even though they are on
matters of federal constitutional law, are generally not subject to
review by the US Supreme Couft.~ In fact, state courts have on occa
sion decided federal constitutional guarantee clause cases on the mer
its.~ One distinguished state court judge, a leading intellectual figure
77.
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in the resurgence of state constitutionalism, has urged state courts to
begin taking more seriously their obligation to apply the Federal
Constitution to some state processes: specifically, state direct legisla
tion by the initiative that bypasses the state’s representative institu
tions.8’
The revival of interest in state constitutions in the US may also
revive state court interest in matters of federal constitutional law that
have previously not been regarded as fairly within the purview of state
courts. Whether this would or could have any influence in Australia is
unclear. Thomson has noted that the jurisdictional reach and power of
federal courts in Australia is expanding, at the expense of state courts.
He also notes that the opposite trend is apparent in the US.~ Still,
illuminating insights can be gained by comparing the operations of the
state and federal courts on constitutional issues in each system.
State constitutional law in the US today is exciting. One does not
have to be an unvarnished foe of monopoly and an advocate of the com
petition of the marketplace to note that federal constitutions] thinking
seemed to grow tired when the US Supreme Court asserted what was
effectively a monopoly position on constitutional jurisprudence. Even
the bicentenary of the US Constitution, an occasion for much breastthumping about the genius of the founding fathers, did not mask its
moribund qualities.
Once one turns to the state constitutions, on the other hand, whole
new worlds beckon, some of them quite uncharted. They reflect vari
ety, history, various political theories, and romance. Each is an infor
mative snapshot; a microcosm of the political and social values that
dominated the place and time where it was created. Each has something
potentially valuable to say about contemporary challenges to govern
mental structure and process, and the age-old tension between govern
ment and individual freedom. Each enlarges the opportunity for rmding
wisdom in what one of our early Supreme Court Justices called “the
most abstruse of all sciences” the science of government.~ Perhaps
the breezes blowing through state constitutional law in the US can
provide some refreshment in Australia too.
-
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